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Abstract
The impact of armed conﬂict on the environment is ofmajor public policy importance.We use a
geographically disaggregated dataset of civil war violence together with satellite imagery of land cover
to test whether war facilitated or prevented forest loss in Sierra Leone. The conﬂict data set allows us to
establishwhere rebel groupswere stationed andwhere battles and attacks occurred. The satellite data
enables to us tomonitor the change in forest cover (total, primary, and secondary) in all of Sierra
Leone’s 151 chiefdoms, between 1990 (prior to thewar) and 2000 (just prior to its end). The results
suggest that conﬂict in Sierra Leone acted as a brake on local deforestation: conﬂict-ridden areas
experienced signiﬁcantly less forest loss relative to theirmore conﬂict-free counterparts.
Introduction
Tropical forests constitute important stocks of natural
capital for many developing countries by generating
beneﬁts, including timber, fuel wood, natural erosion
regulation, and biodiversity [1, 2]. Forests are also
necessary agents in global efforts to combat climate
change because they sequester signiﬁcant amounts of
carbon [3]. Africa’s deforestation rate is twice the
average in the rest of the world [4], making it a focal
point in current discussions to halt deforestation
through mechanisms such as the UN Collaborative
Program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation [5]. Meanwhile, nearly half of
all African countries are currently or have recently
been embroiled in civil war [6]. While war’s adverse
effects on human and physical capital have been
documented [7], evidence of its impact on the
environment is sparse.
Studies on the link between war and the environ-
ment have mainly focused on how either too much or
too little natural capital may cause civil unrest. Propo-
nents of the ‘resource curse’ contend that in weakly
governed states with abundant natural wealth, poli-
tical factions vie to control the sizeable revenues from
resources such as timber that are fueling the conﬂict
and a cycle of exploitation in which forests are both
driver and casualty [8, 9]. Other scholars claim envir-
onmental scarcities can engender violent conﬂict
through a variety of channels [10–12], while still oth-
ers argue that there is unlikely to be a strong relation-
ship between resources and conﬂict [13, 14].
There is a growing literature studying the link run-
ning the other way, from war to environmental
impacts, and the studies that have focused on under-
standing ﬁghting’s consequences for forest loss ﬁnd
mixed results, suggesting that further research will be
useful [15, 16]. In analyzing the implications of
Colombia’s civil war, Álvarez shows that insecurity
promoted deforestation in locations where the Ejército
de Liberación Nacional rebel group cleared land for
coca production, while in other areas they preserved
forests that aided their cover from government sur-
veillance [17]. Dávalos’ investigation into the con-
sequences of Colombia’s war on forest patterns is
similarly inconclusive [18]. In more recent work, Ste-
vens et al (2011) ﬁnd that there was substantial refor-
estation during the early period of the Nicaragua civil
war of the late 1970s and 1980s, while deforestation
increased later in the conﬂict [19]. In contrast, Nack-
oney et al (2014) ﬁnd that there was more rapid pri-
mary forest loss in the Democratic Republic of Congo
during the 1990–2000 period relative to 2000–2010,
and argue that this is consistent with an adverse effect
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of civil war on forests, although the presence of wide-
spread armed conﬂict during both time periods com-
plicates the interpretation of this pattern as a war
impact [20]. In one of the most comprehensive of
recent analyses (and one that uses an approach closely
related to the current paper), Fergusson et al (2014)
examine Colombian municipalities over time and
show that violent activity by paramilitary groups is
associated with signiﬁcantly more local deforesta-
tion [21].
Theoretical predictions from economics and poli-
tical science on whether war is likely to facilitate or
prevent forest loss is also ambiguous. One set of
hypotheses posits that the instability engendered by
war encourages forest extraction because people face
shorter time horizons and higher discount rates, lead-
ing to increased resource extraction. Weakened prop-
erty rights enforcement in the chaos of war may
further embolden armed groups to extract valuable
forest (or other natural) resources to fund their activ-
ities, in a variant of the well-known ‘tragedy of the
commons’ [22].Wartime bombing or chemical spray-
ing, such that employed by the USmilitary in the Viet-
nam War, may also directly destroy forest.
Accordingly, forest cover might be expected to
decrease in conﬂict areas.
A second set of plausible hypotheses point in the
opposite direction, namely that war will protect forests
by raising the costs of extraction and sale while simul-
taneously lowering the expected economic returns to
farming. In wartime, the infrastructure (e.g., roads,
ports) needed to transport timber may simply not be
functional. Trade sanctions may limit access to over-
seas markets. Farmers may also be discouraged from
converting forests into agricultural land because they
fear expropriation of their crop by bandits or soldiers.
More mechanically, farmers may also leave more
existing land fallow in wartime either because they are
literally driven off their land or because they them-
selves become ﬁghters in the conﬂict [23], leading
some ﬁelds to gradually return to a forested state. Alix-
Garcia et al (2013) show that the opposite set of eco-
nomic conditions, namely, rapidly rising income due
to a large-scale government social program inMexico,
led to rapid deforestation, especially in areas char-
acterized by limited local transportation infra-
structure [24].
A key constraint in making research progress in
this important area has been the relative lack of sub-
national data on both war violence and forest loss.
Early studies relied on personal observations and his-
torical accounts of forest degradation and ﬁghting
[25, 26]. Recent work (discussed above) has incorpo-
rated spatially explicit forest measurements, thanks in
part to the rapid evolution of land-change science and
satellite technology [16, 27–29]. Nonetheless, sub-
national conﬂict data are often hard to acquire, not
least because of the chaotic circumstances under
which they are produced. Without this data one
cannot credibly assess how variation in the intensity of
conﬂict within a country affects local environmental
degradation.
In this study, we use a chiefdom-level dataset of
conﬂict incidents in Sierra Leone, which we pair with
remotely-sensed satellite imagery of land cover to
examine evidence of war’s impact on forest cover. The
conﬂict data set allows us to establish where the lead-
ing rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF), was stationed as well as where battles and
attacks occurred. The satellite data enables us tomoni-
tor the change in forest cover (total, primary, second-
ary), in all of Sierra Leone’s 151 chiefdoms, between
roughly 1990 (prior to the civil war) and 2000 (just
prior to the end of the civil war). By combiningmicro-
conﬂict and satellite data in this way we are able to
directly test whether war facilitated or prevented local
forest loss in Sierra Leone.
Materials andmethods
Background
Sierra Leone is located between the 7th and 10th
parallels north of the equator on the west coast of
Africa [30]. Its rainfall is concentrated annually
between May and November and averages 2000 mm
in the north to more than 5000 mm on the coast [31].
This ample supply of water and moisture sustains a
substantial area of primary and secondary forest that
covered two thirds of the country prior to the war
(table 1). Primary forests are either moist evergreen or
semi-deciduous trees, mainly over 30 m high [32].
Typical species in these stands are: Lophira alata,
Heritiera utilis, Uapaoa guineensis, Erythrophleum
ivoransis, Brachystegia leonensis, Piptadeniastrum afri-
canum, Daniallia thurifera, Terminalia ivorensis, Par-
kia bicolor and Anthonotha ﬂagrans [32]. Secondary
growth, which develops when agricultural land (which
had earlier been cleared of primary forest) is left fallow,
consists of younger trees and thickets. Common tree
species are Musanga cecropioides, Carapa procera,
Macaranga barteri, Bridelia micrantha, Myrianthus
arboreus, Phyllanthus discoideus and Sterculia traga-
cantha, as well as the following thicket species: Lantana
camara, Manniophytum fulvum, Abrus precatorius,
Discorea bulbifera, Clematis grandiﬂora, Adenia lobata
and Scleria bovinii [32]. Apart from the tiny fraction of
forest held under government conservation, all
forested areas are communally owned and governed
by a customary land tenure system.
Data
We studied the consequences of Sierra Leone’s civil
war on forests using chiefdom-level datamatchedwith
a remotely sensed time series of land-cover change.
The conﬂict dataset was collected by Sierra Leone’s
No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ) conﬂict mapping
project that kept a comprehensive record of the
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location and intensity of all reported armed violence
during the war [33]. We constructed chiefdom and
district-level measures from the descriptions of inci-
dents in this report. We use two main conﬂict mea-
sures. The ﬁrst captures whether or not an RUF rebel
base was present in a chiefdom during the 1990–2000
period. The second measures the number of battles
and attacks that occurred in each chiefdomor district.
Measuring conﬂict by observing whether or not an
RUF base was present is relevant because, while many
armed actors were involved in the war, over 95%of the
975 recorded attacks, and over 75% of the 1368 recor-
ded battles and attacks, involved the RUF as the pri-
mary ﬁghting force [33]; data construction details are
discussed in the supplemental appendix and in Bel-
lows andMiguel [34]. Since the RUF perpetratedmost
of the violence, it is plausible that land cover could be
affected where RUF bases were stationed. To capture
this effect, we deﬁne a binary (0/1) variable RUFid that
indicates the absence or presence of an RUF base in
chiefdom i and district d. There were on average 0.748
(s.d. 1.266) RUF bases per chiefdom (table 1), and
nearly half of all chiefdoms had anRUF base.
Battles and attacks are also a relevant determinant
of land-cover change because they often involve lar-
ger-scalemilitary campaigns ofmore than 150 soldiers
that could exert formidable pressure on the landscape
and local population. More than 60% of the 1995 vio-
lent incidents included in the NPWJ report were clas-
siﬁed as battles or attacks [34]. Events were coded as
attacks if an armed group came into a village and
burned houses, raped or killed residents. Battles
consisted of armed encounters between two groups
[34]. The data conﬁrm that battles and attacks occur-
red throughout the country with substantial variation
across neighboring chiefdoms (ﬁgure 1, panel C). On
average there were 9.06 (s.d. 9.67) such incidents per
chiefdom (table 1). While it is conceptually possible
that these two measures capture quite different phe-
nomena—for instance, if the presence of an RUF base
and thus greater RUF control of an area leads to fewer
clashes and less violence—these two measures are in
fact strongly positively correlated (correlation coefﬁ-
cient +0.33), and a considerable portion of civil war
violence occurred in areas with RUF bases; to illus-
trate, chiefdomswith RUF bases experiencemore than
twice asmany battles and attacks on average compared
to other chiefdoms, and this difference is signiﬁcant at
99% conﬁdence.
To map forest-cover change, we collaborated with
University of California, Berkeley’s Geospatial Inno-
vation Facility and acquired Landsat satellite data for
Sierra Leone for the period c. 1990–2000. For c. 1990,
Landsat Thematic Mapper (28.5 m) data was
obtained, predominantly 1986; and for c. 2000, Land-
sat Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus (28.5 m) from
1999–2002was obtained, predominantly 2001.
Previous studies have shown that digitally processed
high-resolution satellite images provide the most accu-
rate estimates of the area and distribution of land cover
[35, 36]. Digital analysis was performed on seven images
corresponding with Sierra Leone’s dry season, which
runs from November to March, when the distinction
between forest and non-forest land-cover classes ismost
Table 1.Descriptive statistics for forest cover and conﬂictmeasures. Forest-cover estimates for Sierra Leone are the proportion
forest type of total land area per chiefdom. Estimates forGuinea are the proportion forest type of the partial or total land area
per sub-prefecture locatedwithin 50 kmof the Sierra Leone border. Changes are the proportional point differences between c.
1990 and c. 2000. Conﬂictmeasures present sub-national and national statistics gathered for 1991–2002. RUF indicates the
rebel group the RevolutionaryUnited Front. Battles and attacks are events inwhich two armed groups clash or an armed group
attacks a village.
Landsat c. 1990 Landsat c. 2000 Change
FORESTCOVERDATA Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Sierra Leone (N=151 chiefdoms)
Total cover forest per chiefdom 0.674 (0.266) 0.579 (0.240) −0.096 (0.143)
Primary forest cover per chiefdom 0.203 (0.170) 0.203 (0.170) 0.000 (0.005)
Secondary forest cover per chiefdom 0.472 (0.202) 0.376 (0.154) −0.096 (0.143)
Sierra Leone border region (N=62 chiefdoms)
Total forest cover per chiefdom 0.535 (0.274) 0.548 (0.272) 0.013 (0.050)
Primary forest cover per chiefdom 0.193 (0.188) 0.193 (0.187) 0.000 (0.000)
Secondary forest cover per chiefdom 0.342 (0.141) 0.355 (0.143) 0.013 (0.050)
Guinea border region (N= 54 sub-prefectures)
Total forest cover per sub prefecture 0.434 (0.195) 0.390 (0.185) −0.044 (0.049)
Primary forest cover per sub prefecture 0.042 (0.092) 0.042 (0.092) 0.000 (0.000)
Secondary forest cover per sub prefecture 0.392 (0.176) 0.347 (0.166) −0.044 (0.049)
SIERRALEONECONFLICTDATA (1991–2002) Mean (SD) Total
RUFbases per chiefdom 0.75 (1.27) Number of RUF bases 113
Battles and attacks per chiefdom 9.06 (9.67) Number of battles and attacks 1368
Battles and attacks per district 97.71 (63.71) Number of chiefdoms; districts 151; 14
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pronounced. For each time period, the outputs were
projected into an equal-area coordinate system, edge-
matched and merged into a seamless dataset for Sierra
Leone’s 151 chiefdoms.Weproduced directmeasures of
land-cover change by classifying the c. 1990 and c. 2000
data together in a multi-date image. Deriving change
estimates in this way rather than single-date images
reduces false-change inaccuracies caused by the inevi-
table classiﬁcation errors in each image.
We selected a simple set of forest classes: total
forest, primary forest and secondary forest. Total
forest covers both primary and secondary forest
cover. Primary forest areas cover older, established
forest; secondary forest areas cover younger forest
and scrub areas that often consist of a mixture of
trees at different stages of regeneration as well as high
shrubs. Our outcome measures are the difference in
forest classes for each chiefdom over the two-date
time period.
Methods
We investigate the relationship between conﬂict
incidence and forest-cover change with linear models.
We let F index changes in the three outcomemeasures:
total forest, primary forest, and secondary forest. We
let i and d index the chiefdom and district-level
observations, respectively. We ﬁrst estimate an OLS
regression of the form:
( )F BA XRUF 1 .
(1)
id id id id id1 2α β β γ ε= + + + ′ +
We ﬁrst consider the effect of a rebel RUF base
being present in a chiefdom on forest cover, where
RUFid indicates the presence of a base in chiefdom i in
Figure 1.Geographic variation in total forest cover change, in percentage points/100 (panel A), location of RUF bases (panel B), and
intensity of battles of attacks (panel C) by chiefdom.
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district d.We then turn to examine the impact of battle
and attacks and code 1(BAid) as a binary (0/1) variable
that indicates the absence of a battle or attack in chief-
dom i and district d, in other words, the extensivemar-
gin of such incidents in a chiefdom. Our estimates
capture the mean shift in forest cover change due to
conﬂict exposure measured in these two ways. We
assume the error term ε may be correlated between
neighboring chiefdoms but is independent across dis-
tricts, and include robust standard errors clustered by
district in eachmodel.
In our second model, we estimate the forest cover
outcome conditional on battles or attacks occurring in
chiefdom iwith a log-linearmodel, as in equation (2):
( )
( )
F
X
RUF log BA
log BA . (2)
id id id
d id id
1 2
3
α β β
β γ ε
= + +
+ + ′ +
As in equation (1), we include the indicator for an
RUF base and robust standard errors clustered by dis-
trict. Here, we also take the natural logarithm of the
total number of battles and attacks per chiefdom in
order to facilitate interpretation of coefﬁcient esti-
mates as proportional changes in local conﬂict expo-
sure, obtaining log(BAid). This captures the intensive
margin of such incidents, complementing the
approach in model 1. Since the natural log of zero is
undeﬁned, the small number of chiefdoms (13 chief-
doms, or 8% of the sample) in which no battles or
attacks took place are dropped from the sample, an
approach that is standard in empirical economics (for
instance, in Mincerian estimates of the returns to
schooling, those with zero wages are typically dropped
from the analysis); the results are unchanged using an
alternative approach in which log(x) is replaced with
log(x+ 0.01) throughout (not shown). To test for spil-
lover effects from conﬂict in other nearby chiefdoms
in the same district, we include a further variable log
(BAd) that captures the effect of conﬂict in district d on
its forest cover. The same disruptions to economic
activity and human settlement that might produce
localized conﬂict effects could also affect neighboring
areas.
A key issue for our identiﬁcation strategy is the
possibility that unobserved time-varying factors
besides the war may have affected Sierra Leone’s forest
cover. These trends could be correlated with baseline
chiefdom population and geographic characteristics,
including the degree of remoteness and accessibility to
markets, as well as the presence of other natural
resources, including the important diamond mining
industry in Sierra Leone. One immediate concern is
that RUF bases may have been disproportionately
placed by rebels in remote and inaccessible areas with
ready access to diamond resources, and that under-
lying trends in deforestation in such areas were differ-
ent than in other regions. To partially account for this
and other potential confounding factors, we include a
rich set of chiefdom level covariates Xid in the
preferred empirical speciﬁcations, including primary
and secondary forest cover in 1990, change in yearly
maximumNDVI from 1982 to 1990 (partially captur-
ing pre-war vegetation trends), the number of regis-
tered diamond mines and non-diamond mines,
density of the road network and of rivers, chiefdom
population and population density in 1985, and the
distance to Freetown, the capital and main port (for
details on the data, refer to the supplemental appendix
and Bellows and Miguel [34]). We also show that
results are robust to excluding these covariates.
Regarding the concern that RUF bases were system-
atically located inmore remote areas, note that there is
no statistically signiﬁcant correlation between RUF
base location and baseline primary or secondary forest
coverage (and point estimates are small and t-statistics
less than 1, not shown), suggesting that RUF base loca-
tion decisions were driven by a broader set of
considerations.
Other probable sources of underlying variation are
regional trends in environmental and economic con-
ditions that might have affected trends in Sierra Leone
as a whole. The statistical models above cannot esti-
mate any aggregate national trends. One way to
account for them is to measure outcomes in Sierra
Leone before and after the war to a region not directly
affected by it but plausibly inﬂuenced by similar time-
varying regional economic factors. We construct such
a comparison region in neighboring Guinea from the
portions of sub-prefecture political units located
within 50 km of the shared border. Note that Guinea
did not suffer from civil conﬂict or large-scale political
instability during the study period, making it a plau-
sible counterfactual for Sierra Leone in the absence of
the civil war. We minimize variation between the
regions due to seasonal and annual environmental
conditions by using the same Landsat dataset analyzed
for Sierra Leone. The comparison is more robust to
environmental factors correlated with latitude because
we also restrict the Sierra Leone sample to the chief-
doms located within 50 km of the border. Finally, we
verify that in 1990 the two countries shared similar
aggregate economic trends, particularly with respect
to their GDPs, agricultural sectors, imports and
exports [37]. The estimation equation formodel 3 is:
F SL , (3)i i i1α β ε= + +
where Fi again indexes the changes in forest classes in
the restricted sample of chiefdoms and sub-prefec-
tures indexed by i. SL is a binary (0/1) variable that
takes on a value of 1 for Sierra Leone chiefdoms and 0
for Guinea sub-prefectures. The coefﬁcient on this
term represents the difference between Guinea and
Sierra Leone before versus after the war, where a
leading explanation for any differences is the effect of
the Sierra Leone war on forest-cover change. While
model 3 is arguably more speculative than the main
analysis, since the identifying assumptions are more
challenging to test, it provides a useful additional test
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of the main hypothesis and has the advantage of
capturing any aggregate national effects of the Sierra
Leone conﬂict.
Results
Total forest cover in Sierra Leone chiefdoms declined
by an average of 9.6 percentage points, from 67.5
percent covered to 57.9 percent covered, across the
period of the war (table 1; ﬁgure 2). This downward
trend in forest cover was accounted for entirely by
changes in secondary forest cover, which accounts for
most forest cover in Sierra Leone: average secondary
forest cover dropped from 47.2 to 37.6 percent
between 1990 and 2000. Primary forest cover
remained constant at 20.3 percent across the civil war
period. Despite these trends, visual inspection of
chiefdom-level changes in forest cover reveals remark-
able variation (ﬁgure 1, panel A). Out of a total of 151
chiefdoms, 98 chiefdoms lost cover, 12 chiefdoms
showed no change (within ±1%), and 41 chiefdoms
gained forest cover.
To investigate the impact of conﬂict on these
land-cover changes, we ﬁrst examine the correlation
between the sustained presence of RUF forces in a
chiefdom (i.e., locating a base there) and changes in
forest cover. The location of RUF bases across chief-
doms is presented in ﬁgure 1, panel B. Having a RUF
base in a chiefdom predicts a signiﬁcant increase in
forest cover (relative to chiefdoms that do not con-
tain a base) of 5.98 percentage points (s.e. 2.72) by
model 1 and 6.36 percentage points (s.e. 2.53) by
model 2 (table 2, panel A) in the preferred speciﬁca-
tion with additional covariates. Estimated impacts
are similar in speciﬁcations without additional cov-
ariates, and if anything slightly larger in magnitude,
at 8.67 percentage points in model 1 and 9.37 per-
centage points in model 2. Given overall trends, this
implies that the presence of a rebel base substantially
dampened the decline in forest over time, leading
these chiefdoms to experience less deforestation, and
these effects are statistically signiﬁcant at high levels
of conﬁdence (P< 0.05). This conﬂict effect is medi-
ated entirely by changes in secondary forest cover,
with primary forest cover being unaffected by the
RUF base measure (table 2, panels B and C). It is
worth pointing out that this relationship is not sim-
ply the result of the RUF deciding to locate bases in
more remote forested areas, since there is no sig-
niﬁcant relationship between baseline forest cover
and RUF base placement (as noted above), and these
estimates are conditional on a wide range of baseline
chiefdom population, geographic, resource, and
transportation characteristics (details in supple-
mental appendix tables A1–A3).
Neither the occurrence of any chiefdom level
battles and attacks, nor the number of such battles
and attacks at the chiefdom level, are signiﬁcantly
associated with changes in chiefdom forest cover
(table 2, models 1 and 2). Districts are a higher
administrative level than chiefdoms, with 14 districts
nationwide. A 10 percent (approximately 10 log
point) increase in battles and attacks within the dis-
trict predicts a 0.522 percentage point (s.e. 0.341)
increase in chiefdom forest cover, and these effects
are marginally statistically signiﬁcant with a P-value
near 0.10 in the preferred speciﬁcation with addi-
tional covariates. We obtain a similar result if we
exclude the chiefdom itself when constructing the
district average battles and attack variable. Results
are again driven by changes in secondary forest
(panels B and C).
Comparing a restricted sample of Sierra Leone
chiefdoms with the sample of Guinea sub-prefectures
directly on the opposite side of the border reinforces
the ﬁnding that civil war had a positive effect on local
forest growth. Note that the magnitude of the effect
size in model 3 is not directly comparable withmodels
Figure 2.Comparison of pre and post-war forest classes in Sierra Leone, derived fromLandsat ThematicMapper (28.5 m) and
Landsat EnhancedThematicMapper Plus (28.5 m) images for the period c. 1990–2000. Three classes of forest are represented:
primary, secondary, and total forest.
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1 and 2 since the explanatory variables differ. More-
over, it represents a lower bound estimate for the rea-
son that, having hosted more than a quarter million
war refugees from Sierra Leone, southern Guinea was
also not impervious to the conﬂict [38]. However, if
we accept the assumption that the chiefdoms and sub-
prefectures on both sides of the border would have
experienced similar trends on average except for the
occurrence of direct armed conﬂict in Sierra Leone,
the indicator variable for location on the Sierra Leone
side of the border shows that chiefdoms in Sierra
Leone experienced a 5.71 percentage point increase (s.
e. 0.92, P< 0.01) in total forest cover compared to
their counterparts in Guinea (table 3, panel A), with
effects once again driven by secondary forest cover
(panels B andC).
Collectively, these results suggest that conﬂict in
Sierra Leone acted as a brake on local deforestation:
conﬂict-ridden areas with rebel bases experienced sig-
niﬁcantly less forest loss relative to theirmore conﬂict-
free counterparts, districts experiencing more attacks
and battles had somewhat less forest loss, and chief-
doms in war-torn Sierra Leone experienced sig-
niﬁcantly less forest loss relative to comparable regions
directly across the border inGuinea.
Discussion
While rich in forest and other natural resources,
particularly diamonds, Sierra Leone’s people are
Table 2.Effect of battles and attacks on changes in forest classes.Models with total, primary, and secondary forest as dependent variables, in
panels A, B andC, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. The 13 chiefdoms that did not experience any battles and attacks are dropped
fromModel 2 since the logarithm is undeﬁned in that case. Columns 2 and 4 include controls for primary forest cover in 1990, secondary
forest cover in 1990, change in yearlymaximumNDVI from1982 to 1990, the number of registered diamondmines, the number of other
non-diamondmines, density of the road network, density of rivers, chiefdompopulation and population density in 1985, and log distance to
Freetown. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance levels: *** P<0.01, ** P< 0.05, * P< 0.1.
Model 1 Model 2
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: total forest cover
Indicator of RUF base in chiefdom 0.0871** (0.0383) 0.0598** (0.0272) 0.0937* (0.0441) 0.0636** (0.0253)
Indicator for chiefdombattles and
attacks >0
−0.0363 (0.0503) 0.0151 (0.0391)
Log (Chiefdombattles and attacks) −0.0100 (0.0109) −0.0002 (0.0113)
Log (district battles and attacks) 0.0883 (0.0596) 0.0522 (0.0341)
R-squared 0.085 0.550 0.162 0.564
Panel B: primary forest cover
Indicator of RUF base in chiefdom −0.00010 (0.00013) −0.00011 (0.00014) −0.000035 (0.000091) −0.000064 (0.000114)
Indicator for chiefdombattles and
attacks >0
−0.000071 (0.000044) −0.000033 (0.000088)
Log (Chiefdombattles and attacks) −0.000103 (0.000064) −0.000090 (0.000065)
Log (district battles and attacks) 0.000047 (0.000152) 0.000047 (0.000127)
R-squared 0.009 0.083 0.026 0.099
Panel C: secondary forest cover
Indicator of RUF base in chiefdom 0.0872** (0.0382) 0.0599** (0.0272) 0.0938* (0.0441) 0.0637** (0.0253)
Indicator for chiefdombattles and
attacks >0
−0.0363 (0.0504) 0.0150 (0.0391)
Log (Chiefdombattles and attacks) −0.00993 (0.0109) −0.00012 (0.0113)
Log (District battles and attacks) 0.0883 (0.0595) 0.0521 (0.0340)
R-squared 0.085 0.550 0.163 0.564
Additional covariates No Yes No Yes
Number of chiefdomobservations 151 146 138 137
Number of district observations 14 14 14 14
Table 3. Sierra Leone effect on changes in forest classes. Comparison
of percentage point changes in forest types (before versus after the
war) between Sierra Leone chiefdoms andGuinea sub-prefectures.
Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance levels: *** p< 0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Model 3
Variable Coefﬁcient SE
Panel A: total forest cover
Sierra Leone border region 0.0571*** (0.00921)
R-squared 0.252
Panel B: primary forest cover
Sierra Leone border region −0.000137 (.0000917)
R-squared 0.019
Panel C: secondary forest cover
Sierra Leone border region 0.0572*** (0.00918)
R-squared 0.254
Number of Sierra Leone observations 62
Number ofGuinea observations 54
Total number of observations 116
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amongst the world’s poorest [39, 40]. They weremade
worse by the 1991–2002 civil war, which killed an
estimated 50 000 people, forced two million others to
abandon their homes, and brutalized thousands more
with mutilation, rape, and violence [41, 42]. Histori-
cally, more than two thirds of the economically active
population was engaged in subsistence farming [37],
with farmers generally practicing a system of ‘bush
fallowing’, otherwise known as slash-and-burn agri-
culture [43, 32]. More often than not, this technique
entailed cutting down forest stands for the purpose of
cultivating crops in fertile soil [32].
The presence of a RUF base signals sustained mili-
tary activity and violence against civilians in a chief-
dom. Though soldiers also engaged in longer-range
battles and attacks, they returned to their bases and
rely on terrorizing local populations both to staff and
feed their armies [44]. The positive relationship we
observe in table 2 between the presence of RUF bases
and forest growth is thus consistent with the class of
political economy theoretical hypotheses that predict
that the existence of armed conﬂict, and its attendant
disruption of local economic activity, may in some
cases help to slow deforestation. It is also consistent
with the ﬁnding that rebel groups in certain parts of
Liberia predated on civilians, triggering large drops in
food production [45].
One plausible reason why this might be the case is
that the militias recruited soldiers and porters from
the population surrounding their bases, who either
responded voluntarily to the allure of sharing in the
spoils of war or were forcibly abducted. The loss of
local farming population slows the conversion of for-
est to agricultural land and also encourages reforesta-
tion of existing land. Recent research supports this
hypothesis [23, 46]. Upon interviewing a group of over
1000 randomly selected ex-combatants from Sierra
Leone, Humphreys and Weinstein learned that the
majority of recruits for both the RUF recruits and the
main pro-governmentmilitia, the Civil Defense Force,
originated from rural areas. Moreover, they deter-
mined that ﬁghters’ top pre-war occupations were
farming and schooling, and that the RUF often tar-
geted rural schools for recruitment (e.g., the children
of farmers who also sometimes did farm work
themselves).
Another possible theoretical mechanism that is
consistent with our results is that RUF forces terror-
ized some farmers into economic inactivity. As part of
a strategy ofmaintaining control of both resources and
people in the areas around their bases, RUF soldiers
were notorious for their pernicious tactics, particu-
larly physical mutilation [47]. With machetes and
axes, they routinely intimidated the civilians they
encountered by severing their genitals, limbs, lips, and
ears [48] in an attempt to brutalize them into submis-
sion. These activities, coupled with local recruitment
of ﬁghters, diminished agricultural activity in the
chiefdoms containing RUF bases, with attendant
increases in the degree of local forest cover. Thus
under no circumstances should the slower deforesta-
tion in RUF controlled areas be interpreted as the
result of enlightened policy decisions on the part of the
rebel group. Note that the maintenance of forest in
areas with more RUF bases is unlikely to be due to a
desire for greater cover against enemy bombing given
the limited use of air power in the Sierra Leone civil
war [49].
Our results on the impact of battles and attacks
point in a similar direction. Whilst the presence of a
RUF base tends to signal sustained violence against
civilians, battles and attacks in the Sierra Leone civil
war tended to be sporadic and of short duration. This
helps explain why our chiefdom battle and attacks
measure is less strongly associated with forest change
than the chiefdom RUF base presence measure. How-
ever, when battles and attacks become prevalent
within a broader geographical area, like the district,
then there is suggestive evidence that the rate of defor-
estation falls. This pattern indicates that widespread
armed conﬂict disrupts agricultural activity by dis-
abling key forms of transportation and marketing
infrastructure,much of which only exists at the district
level. This disruption in turn blunts incentives for
farmers to invest in expanding or even maintaining
farmland, thus conferring some protection to adjacent
forests.
The complex set of factors that drive land cover
change make it challenging to isolate the effect of war
alone, especially if trends in both agricultural produc-
tion and armed conﬂict were sensitive to local climatic
and environmental conditions. In this sense, our com-
parison of Sierra Leone chiefdoms with nearby Guinea
prefectures arguably provides a useful test because it
removes a signiﬁcant part of unobservable agro-cli-
matic variation that may affect forest cover regardless
of conﬂict incidence (table 3). The fact that we ﬁnd
that conﬂict afﬂicted chiefdoms in Sierra Leone suffer
much less forest loss relative to prefectures across the
border in Guinea therefore gives us greater conﬁdence
that our RUF base and district battles and attacks
results are in fact capturing the causal impact of war on
forests. Note that 60 percent of all RUF bases are loca-
ted in the subsample of Sierra Leone chiefdoms near
theGuinea border (ﬁgure 1, panel B; ﬁgure 3).
Due in part to favorable climate and soil factors,
Sierra Leone is a highly forested country, with almost
60 percent of the country under forest after the war, of
which roughly two thirds is secondary forest and one
third is primary forest. A notable ﬁnding in our analy-
sis is that the impact of war is only observed in second-
ary forest cover. Primary forest is virtually untouched
both nationwide and in chiefdoms experiencing more
war violence. In fact, during our study period of
1990–2000, primary forest conversion was effectively
zero in 141 of 151 chiefdoms, and the remaining 10
chiefdoms lost at most 3.0 km2 of primary forest. The
leading explanation is that secondary forest is typically
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located closer to human habitation and agricultural
land, and thus is more directly impacted by local eco-
nomic and political events. The resilience of primary
forest stands in Sierra Leonean chiefdoms also points
to the difﬁculty of pursuing large-scale timber extrac-
tion in a country experiencing amajor civil war. Roads
throughout the country, and especially in the fairly
remote areas with primary forest, fell into bad repair
and were often too dangerous to travel due to the
threat of rebel violence, making it difﬁcult to get
machinery in and timber out. Though secondary for-
ests offer considerable amenities—in the form of car-
bon sequestration, biodiversity preservation, erosion
prevention, fuel and food—they are far less dependent
on networked infrastructure for their extraction. This
in turn means they are much more affected by the
intensity of local armed conﬂict, as our analysis ﬁnds.
Conclusion
Many observers have argued that war will have a
devastating impact on the environment and conserva-
tion outcomes, as it undoubtedly has on the popula-
tions affected by conﬂict. Our study, which makes
innovative use of within-country conﬂict and remote
sensing data, demonstrates that reality may be more
nuanced. Indeed, we ﬁnd that having more intense
conﬂict in a particular part of Sierra Leone actually
helped to prevent the local degradation of secondary
forests. These ﬁndings underscore the usefulness of
using spatially explicit micro-data to study how war
impacts the environment, and form part of ongoing
efforts tomake progress in this important area [50].
To be absolutely clear, it goes without saying that
these ﬁndings do not imply that civil conﬂict should be
seen as socially desirable in any sense. While precise
data on the channels underlying these patterns is una-
vailable for Sierra Leone (as in many war-torn socie-
ties), a plausible explanation is that widespread
disruption of economic activity, due in part to forced
recruitment into armed groups and physical displace-
ment of a terrorized rural population, contributed to
sharply reduced agricultural production in areas
directly affected by war violence, with subsequent
regrowth of secondary forest in some places.
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